Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games

David Housman ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 3, 377-404

Abstract: A partially defined cooperative game is a coalition function form game in which some of the coalitional worths are not known. An application would be cost allocation of a joint project among so many players that the determination of all coalitional worths is prohibitive. This paper generalizes the concept of the Shapley value for cooperative games to the class of partially defined cooperative games. Several allocation method characterization theorems are given utilizing linearity, symmetry, formulation independence, subsidy freedom, and monotonicity properties. Whether a value exists or is unique depends crucially on the class of games under consideration.

Keywords: allocation; method; ·; value; ·; cooperative; game; ·; axioms; ·; incomplete; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-20
Note: Received June 1996/Revised August 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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