Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions

Ori Haimanko (), Aner Sela, Ram Orzach () and Ezra Einy ()
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Ram Orzach: Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel Final version November 2001
Ezra Einy: Economics Department, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 3, 405-419

Abstract: In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy exists, it is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to bidder's information field; if the dominant strategy is used, other bidders cannot make a profit.

Keywords: common-value; second-price; auctions; ·; differential; information; ·; dominant; strategies; ·; information; superiority; ·; winner's; curse. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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