Note Equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case

Julien Geitner
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Julien Geitner: Département de Mathématiques et d'Informatique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 45 rue d'Ulm - 75005 Paris. France.

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 3, 449-452

Abstract: We prove that the existence of equilibrium payoffs for stochastic games of incomplete symmetric information follows from the same result for stochastic games with complete information.

Keywords: stochastic; games; ·; symmetric; incomplete; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-20
Note: Received January 1999/Revised October 2001
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