Stay-in-a-set games

Piercesare Secchi and William D. Sudderth ()
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Piercesare Secchi: Dipartimento di Matematica, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, 20133 Milano, Italy
William D. Sudderth: School of Statistics, University of Minnesota, Church Street SE 224, 55455 Minneapolis, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 4, 479-490

Abstract: There exists a Nash equilibrium (-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each player i is one when the process of states remains in a given set of states Gi and is zero otherwise.

Keywords: Stochastic; game; ·; Nash; equilibrium; ·; gambling; theory; ·; games; of; survival. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-27
Note: Received: December 2000
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