N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs

Piercesare Secchi and William D. Sudderth ()
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Piercesare Secchi: Dipartimento di Matematica, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, 20133 Milano, Italy
William D. Sudderth: School of Statistics, University of Minnesota, Church Street SE 224, 55455 Minneapolis, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 4, 502 pages

Abstract: Every n-person stochastic game with a countable state space, finite action sets for the players and bounded, upper semi-continuous payoffs has an -equilibrium for every >0.

Keywords: stochastic; game; · (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-27
Note: Received: January 2001
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