Maximal stable sets of two-player games

Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 4, 557-566

Abstract: If a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are connected components of perfect equilibria.

Keywords: Perfect equilibria; stable sets. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-27
Note: Received: October 1999/Revised: February 2001
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