Note On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games

Theo Driessen () and Elena Yanovskaya
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Theo Driessen: Faculty of Mathematical Sciences, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands Revised version: December 2001

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 4, 609 pages

Abstract: In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called linear consistency, together with some kind of standardness for two-person games, imply efficiency, anonymity, linearity, as well as uniqueness of the value. Among others, this uniform treatment generalizes Sobolev's axiomatization of the Shapley value.

Keywords: Cooperative; TU-game; ·; value; ·; consistency; ·; reduced; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-27
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