The bargaining set of four-person balanced games

Tamás Solymosi

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 31, issue 1, 11 pages

Abstract: It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person case. We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides with the bargaining set {\cal M}i1. Our discussion employs a generalization of balancedness to games with coalition structures.

Keywords: cooperative; game; ·; bargaining; set; ·; core; ·; coalition; structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-10-02
Note: Received: August 2001/Revised version: April 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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