Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs

Srihari Govindan and Tilman Klumpp ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 31, issue 2, 229-243

Abstract: We extend the results of Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel (1991b) to obtain a finite characterization of perfect equilibria in terms of lexicographic probability systems (LPSs). The LPSs we consider are defined over individual strategy sets and thus capture the property of independence among players' actions. Our definition of a product LPS over joint actions of the players is shown to be canonical, in the sense that any independent LPS on joint actions is essentially equivalent to a product LPS according to our definition.

Keywords: Perfect equilibrium; lexicographic beliefs; independence; finite characterization. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-22
Note: Received February 2002/Final version June 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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