A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers

Marilda Sotomayor ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 31, issue 2, 269-283

Abstract: A labor market where firms and workers are heterogeneous and may form more than one partnership is considered. A natural concept of core for such markets, different from the concept used by Thompson (1977), is defined. We show that the core is non-empty and is, in general, strictly greater than Thompson's core. Unlike Thompson, we found several dissimilarities between our model and the well known one-to-one case studied in Shapley and Shubik (1972).

Keywords: stable payoff; core; optimal stable payoffs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-22
Note: Received April 2001/Revised July 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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