On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games: a generalization

Giulio Codognato and Sayantan Ghosal

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 31, issue 4, 493-498

Abstract: In this paper, we generalize the exitence result for pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games. By working directly on integrals of pure strategies, we also generalize, for the same class of games, the existence result for undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria even though, in general, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria may fail to be weakly compact. Copyright Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; pure strategy; nonatomic game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820300132

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