Lower semicontinuity for approximate social Nash equilibria

Jacqueline Morgan and Roberto Raucci ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 31, issue 4, 499-509

Abstract: We introduce a suitable concept of approximate social Nash equilibrium and we determine sufficient conditions of minimal character which guarantee, for a parametric social Nash equilibrium problem, the lower semicontinuity of the set-valued function defined by these approximate solutions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Social Nash equilibrium; lower semicontinuity of a set-valued function; ε-approximate Nash equilibrium; two-stage non-zero sum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820300134

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