Control costs and potential functions for spatial games

Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller () and Philippe Solal

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 31, issue 4, 561 pages

Abstract: Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games played on quasi-symmetric weighted graphs and explore the properties of the ensuing Markov chain. Copyright Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Control Costs; Evolutionary Games; Potentials; Spatial Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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DOI: 10.1007/s001820300138

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