Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs

Taiji Furusawa and Quan Wen ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 31, issue 4, 591 pages

Abstract: We study a bargaining model where (i) players’ interim disagreement payoffs are stochastic and (ii) in any period, the proposer may postpone making an offer without losing the right to propose in the following period. This bargaining model has a generically unique perfect equilibrium payoff for each player, and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient in some cases, featuring a stochastically delayed agreement. We show that both the variation of players’ interim disagreement payoffs and the proposer’s ability to postpone making an offer without losing the right to propose are necessary for the existence of such a unique and inefficient perfect equilibrium outcome. Copyright Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Negotiation; stochastic bargaining; disagreement payoffs; delay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820300140

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