EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining

Tomohiko Kawamori

International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, vol. 37, issue 4, 525-532

Keywords: Selection of proposers; Recognition probability; Protocol; Efficiency; Coalitional bargaining; C78; C72; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-008-0131-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:525-532

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2019-09-12
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:525-532