The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

Yuji Fujinaka and Toyotaka Sakai

International Journal of Game Theory, 2009, vol. 38, issue 3, 325-348

Keywords: Consequence of strategic manipulation; Nash implementation; Mechanism design; Existence of ɛ-Nash equilibrium; Strategy-proofness; Indivisible good; D63; C72; D61; C78; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7

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