Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games
Dimitri Dubois (),
Marc Willinger () and
P. Van Nguyen ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Phu Nguyen-Van ()
International Journal of Game Theory, 2012, vol. 41, issue 2, 369-380
Keywords: Coordination game; Game theory; Experimental economics; C72; C92; D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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