Axiomatizing core extensions

Camelia Bejan and Juan Gomez ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2012, vol. 41, issue 4, 885-898

Abstract: We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core (Guesnerie and Oddou, Econ Lett 3(4):301–306, 1979 ; Sun et al. J Math Econ 44(7–8):853–860, 2008 ) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The main result of the paper generalizes Peleg’s (J Math Econ 14(2):203–214, 1985 ) core axiomatization to the entire family of TU-games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Core extensions; Axiomatization; Aspiration core; C-core; Consistency; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0316-4

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