An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets

Francesc Llerena (), Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 1, 15 pages

Abstract: On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents’ reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in (Math Opr Res 4:303–338, 1979 ). Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Cooperative games; Assignment game; Core; Nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z

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