Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching

Francis Flanagan

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 1, 209-223

Abstract: I introduce a general many-to-one matching framework which includes the matching with contracts model as well as models of matching with preferences over colleagues as special cases. I show that this general model can be embedded into the model with contracts, and the model with contracts can be embedded in the model with preferences over colleagues, thus the models are equivalent, and all results from the many-to-one matching with preferences over colleagues literature and the model with contracts literature can be applied to each other. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Many-to-one matching; Matching with contracts; Matching with colleagues; Coalition formation; Stability; C62; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-014-0426-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:209-223

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0426-x

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().