Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games

Boyu Zhang () and Josef Hofbauer

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 2, 433-448

Abstract: This paper studies two equilibrium selection methods based on replicator dynamics. A Nash equilibrium is called centroid dominant if the trajectory of the replicator dynamics starting at the centroid of the strategy simplex converges to it. On the other hand, an equilibrium is called basin dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction. These two concepts are compared with risk dominance in the context of $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 bimatrix coordination games. The main results include (a) if a Nash equilibrium is both risk dominant and centroid dominant, it must have the largest basin of attraction, (b) the basin dominant equilibrium must be risk dominant or centroid dominant. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Equilibrium selection; Replicator dynamics; Risk dominance; Basins of attraction; C62; C73; D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0437-7

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