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Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning

Georgios Chasparis (), Jeff Shamma () and Anders Rantzer ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 3, 667-699

Abstract: For several reinforcement learning models in strategic-form games, convergence to action profiles that are not Nash equilibria may occur with positive probability under certain conditions on the payoff function. In this paper, we explore how an alternative reinforcement learning model, where the strategy of each agent is perturbed by a strategy-dependent perturbation (or mutations) function, may exclude convergence to non-Nash pure strategy profiles. This approach extends prior analysis on reinforcement learning in games that addresses the issue of convergence to saddle boundary points. It further provides a framework under which the effect of mutations can be analyzed in the context of reinforcement learning. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Learning in games; Reinforcement learning; Replicator dynamics; C72; C73; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0449-3

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