Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes

Federico Quartieri and Ryusuke Shinohara ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 4, 785-813

Abstract: We examine the coalition-proofness and Pareto properties of Nash equilibria in pure strategy $$\sigma $$ σ -interactive games with strategic substitutes and increasing/decreasing externalities. For this class of games: (i) we prove the equivalence among the set of Nash equilibria, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strong Pareto dominance and the set of Nash equilibria that are not strongly Pareto dominated by other Nash equilibria; (ii) we prove that the fixpoints of some “ extremal” selections from the joint best reply correspondence are both coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak Pareto dominance and not weakly Pareto dominated by other Nash equilibria. We also provide an order-theoretic characterization of the set of Nash equilibria and show various applications of our results. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Pareto dominance; Strategic substitutes; Externalities; Generalized aggregative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0452-8

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