On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 4, 869-890

Abstract: We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategy equilibria. We illustrate that in continuous supermodular games, perfect equilibria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in discontinuous supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security, perfect equilibria may involve play of actions in the interior of the set of weakly dominated actions. We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess pure strategy perfect equilibria outside the interior of the set of weakly dominated action profiles. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Supermodular game; Weakly dominated strategy; Perfect equilibrium; Strategically stable set; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Working Paper: On Equilibrium Refinement in Supermodular Games (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0457-3

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