Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state

J. Kuipers (), J. Flesch, G. Schoenmakers and K. Vrieze
Additional contact information
J. Kuipers: Maastricht University
J. Flesch: Maastricht University
G. Schoenmakers: Maastricht University
K. Vrieze: Maastricht University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2016, vol. 45, issue 1, No 10, 205-237

Abstract: Abstract We consider a class of multi-player games with perfect information and deterministic transitions, where each player controls exactly one non-absorbing state, and where rewards are zero for the non-absorbing states. With respect to the average reward, we provide a combinatorial proof that a subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium exists, for every game in our class and for every $$\varepsilon > 0$$ ε > 0 . We believe that the proof of this result is an important step towards a proof for the more general hypothesis that all perfect information stochastic games, with finite state space and finite action spaces, have a subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium for every $$\varepsilon > 0$$ ε > 0 with respect to the average reward criterium.

Keywords: Perfect information game; Recursive game; Subgame-perfect equilibrium; Average reward (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0502-x

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