Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities

Dominik Karos ()
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Dominik Karos: University of Oxford

International Journal of Game Theory, 2016, vol. 45, issue 4, No 3, 817-838

Abstract: Abstract I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a core stable partition can be found, i.e. a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions.

Keywords: Games with non-transferable utility in partition function form; Bargaining with claims; Ordinal games; Core stable partitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5

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