An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration

Brian R. Powers ()
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Brian R. Powers: Arizona State University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 1, No 4, 108 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider a final-offer arbitration problem between two players with two quantitative issues in dispute. Under reasonable assumptions we model the problem as a zero-sum two person game and show that a pair of pure strategies explicitly constructed are the unique minimax strategies for the two players.

Keywords: Final-offer arbitration; Non-cooperative game theory; Multi-issue; Brams–Merrill (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0653-7

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