On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players

Avishay Aiche ()
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Avishay Aiche: Western Galilee College

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 2, No 4, 421 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies vector-measure games in which the set of players is represented by a mixed measure space with atoms and with an atom-less part. The bargaining set introduced in Mas-Colell (J Math Econ 18(2):129–139, 1989) for a continuum exchange economy is adapted and analyzed within this (TU) market game. It is shown that the equal treatment imputations in the bargaining set have some interesting properties. In particular, we prove an extension of the budgetary exploitation property of core allocations in mixed markets to equal-treatment imputations in the Mas-Colell bargaining set.

Keywords: Vector measure games; TU market games; Bargaining set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0632-z

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