Differential game of optimal pursuit of one evader by many pursuers

Mehdi Salimi () and Massimiliano Ferrara ()
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Mehdi Salimi: Technische Universität Dresden
Massimiliano Ferrara: University Mediterranea of Reggio Calabria

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 2, No 7, 490 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study a differential game in which a finite or countable number of pursuers pursue a single evader. The control functions of players satisfy integral constraints. The period of the game, which is denoted as $$\zeta $$ ζ , is determined. The farness between the evader and the closest pursuer when the game is finished is the payoff function of the game. In the paper, we introduce the value of the game and identify optimal strategies of the pursuers. A significant facet of this work is that there is no relation between the energy resource of any pursuer and that of the evader for completing pursuit.

Keywords: Differential game; Pursuit evasion game; Integral constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0638-6

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