Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable

Martin Van der Linden

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 2, No 12, 609-645

Abstract: Abstract This paper shows that the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) cannot be improved upon in terms of manipulability without compromising stability. A conflict between manipulability and fairness is also identified. Stable mechanisms that minimize the set of individuals who match with their least preferred achievable mate are shown to be maximally manipulable among the stable mechanisms. These mechanisms are also more manipulable than DA. A similar conflict between fairness and manipulability is identified in the case of the median stable mechanisms.

Keywords: Matching; Deferred acceptance; Manipulability; Stability; Fairness; C78; D47; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0649-3

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