Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber and Alexei Zakharov ()
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Shlomo Weber: New Economic School
Alexei Zakharov: National Research University Higher School of Economics

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 3, No 1, 713-753

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model with two incumbent candidates and a potential entrant. All candidates are rank-motivated. We first consider the case where the low valence incumbent (LVC) and the entrant have zero valence, whereas the valence of the high valence incumbent (HVC) is positive. We show that a sufficiently large valence of HVC guarantees a unique equilibrium, where the two incumbents prevent the entry of the third candidate. We also show that an increase in valence allows HVC to adopt a more centrist policy position, while LVC selects a more extreme position. We also examine the existence of equilibrium for the cases where the LVC has higher or lower valence than the entrant.

Keywords: Valence; Candidates; Electoral game; Rank objectives; Electoral equilibrium; Distribution of ideal points; C72; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00659-3

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