Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers

Daeyoung Jeong ()
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Daeyoung Jeong: POSTECH

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 4, No 6, 1139-1167

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies a job market signaling model with imperfect competition among employers. In our basic model, workers are differentiated in productivity and preference over employers, both of which are workers’ private information. We conclude that if competition is sufficiently strong, a separating equilibrium exists. We also show that stronger competition among employers intensifies competition between workers; workers invest more in costly education to get attractive jobs, and social welfare decreases. When employers can observe worker’s preferences, wage discrimination strengthens competition among employers and makes workers better off.

Keywords: Signaling; Job market; Horizontal competition; Wage discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 J31 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00685-1

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