Labelling, homophily and preference evolution

Jiabin Wu ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 1, No 1, 22 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider a population of agents whose preference types are unobservable but imperfectly correlated with certain observable labels such as customs, languages, and origins. In addition, the matching process exhibits homophily: agents tend to interact with those who share the same labels. We show that labelling and homophily interact in a non-trivial way to influence the evolution of preferences, which cannot be accounted for in the extant literature.

Keywords: Homophily; Labelling; Assortative matching; Preference evolution; Evolutionary game theory; C73; D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00672-6

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