Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities

Takaaki Abe ()
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Takaaki Abe: Waseda University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 1, No 5, 97-117

Abstract: Abstract This paper provides conditions for a game with externalities to have a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS). We observe that the notion of convexity defined by Hafalir [Games Econ Behav 61:242–258, 2007] does not guarantee the existence of a PMAS in the presence of externalities. We introduce a new notion of convexity and show that while our convexity is not a stronger condition than Hafalir’s [Games Econ Behav 61:242–258, 2007] , it is a sufficient condition for a game to have a PMAS. Moreover, we show that the Aumann-Drèze value, which is defined for games with coalition structures, explicitly constructs a PMAS. In addition, we offer two necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee a PMAS in the presence of externalities.

Keywords: Convexity; Core; Externalities; Population monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00675-3

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