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A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information

Andrés Salamanca Lugo ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 1, No 9, 195-225

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted-utility transfer procedure. We construct a three-player cooperative game in which Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 13(2):69–96, 1984a) generalization of the Shapley NTU value does not capture some “negative” externality generated by the adverse selection. However, when we explicitly compute the S-solution in this game, it turns out that it prescribes a more intuitive outcome which takes into account the above mentioned informational externality.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Incomplete information; Virtual utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information (2016) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00686-0

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