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Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

Felipe Balmaceda ()
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Felipe Balmaceda: Diego Portales University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 2, No 10, 637 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies a principal-agent relationship when both are risk-neutral and in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. Contracts must satisfy the limited-liability and monotonicity conditions. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal contract is simple, in the sense that each type is offered the same contract. These are: the action and the agent’s type are complements, and the output’s cumulative distribution function is such that the marginal rate of substitution between the action and the agent’s type is the same for each possible output realization. Furthermore, under the average monotone likelihood ratio property, the optimal contract is a call-option contract as in Innes (J Econ Theory 52(1):45–67, 1990). The results shed light on the fact that sometimes contracts are not highly dependent on individual characteristics as predicted in most pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection settings.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Adverse selection; Limited liability; Monotonicity; Optimal mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00700-5

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