A model of parallel contests

Wei-Torng Juang (), Guang-Zhen Sun and Kuo-Chih Yuan ()
Additional contact information
Wei-Torng Juang: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica
Kuo-Chih Yuan: Soochow University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 2, No 12, 672 pages

Abstract: Abstract We develop a model of two parallel contests, asymmetric in quantity of homogeneous prizes open to contest, with a finite number of homogeneous risk-neutral bidders. Whether the bidder upon entry into a particular contest is aware of the realized number of competing contestants in the contest is irrelevant to the expected effort at equilibrium. At equilibrium the expected effort per capita in the larger contest (the contest with more prizes) is greater than that in the smaller one. The larger contest nonetheless does not attract enough contestants to achieve optimum in rent extraction from the bidders.

Keywords: Parallel contests; Rent extraction; Participation effect; Effort effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-019-00705-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00705-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00705-0

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().