Cyclic dominance in a two-person rock–scissors–paper game
Liliana Garrido-da-Silva () and
Sofia B. S. D. Castro ()
Additional contact information
Liliana Garrido-da-Silva: Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto (CMUP)
Sofia B. S. D. Castro: Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto (CMUP)
International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 3, No 11, 885-912
Abstract:
Abstract The Rock–scissors–paper game has been studied to account for cyclic behaviour under various game dynamics. We use a two-person parametrised version of this game. The cyclic behaviour is observed near a heteroclinic cycle, in a heteroclinic network, with two nodes such that, at each node, players alternate in winning and losing. This cycle is shown to be as stable as possible for a wide range of parameter values. The parameters are related to the players’ payoff when a tie occurs.
Keywords: Price setting; Rock–scissors–paper game; Cyclic dynamics; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-020-00706-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00706-4
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00706-4
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel
More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().