Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players

Takuya Iimura

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 3, No 2, 697 pages

Abstract: Abstract We prove some interesting properties of unilaterally competitive games when there are more than two players. We show that such games possess: (1) a Nash equilibrium, (2) maximin-solvability, (3) strong solvability in the sense of Nash, and (4) weak acyclicity, all in pure strategies of finite or infinite games.

Keywords: Unilaterally competitive games; Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium; Maximin; Strongly solvable games; Weak acyclicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00724-2

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