On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals

Bettina Klaus () and Panos Protopapas

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 4, No 7, 1059-1080

Abstract: Abstract We study correspondences that choose an interval of alternatives when agents have single-peaked preferences over locations and ordinally extend their preferences over intervals. We extend the main results of Moulin (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) to our setting and show that the results of Ching (Soc Choice Welf 26:473–490, 1997) cannot always be similarly extended. First, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness characterize the class of generalized median correspondences (Theorem 1). Second, this result neither holds on the domain of symmetric and single-peaked preferences, nor can in this result min/max continuity substitute peaks-onliness (see counter-Example 3). Third, strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize the class of efficient generalized median correspondences (Theorem 2).

Keywords: Correspondences; Generalized median correspondences; Single-peaked preferences; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals (2020)
Working Paper: On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00728-y

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