Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach

David Lowing () and Makoto Yokoo ()
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David Lowing: University of Paris-Saclay
Makoto Yokoo: Kyushu University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 5, 32 pages

Abstract: Abstract A Sharing value for transferable utility games allocates the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition among the players within the coalition’s support. Such allocation is conducted in accordance with a specific sharing system that defines the Sharing value. In this paper, we extend Sharing values to multi-choice games. Multi-choice games represent a generalization of transferable utility games, wherein players can choose from multiple activity levels. Unlike transferable utility games, there is no straightforward method to interpret the support of a coalition in a multi-choice game. This complicates the process of distributing the Harsanyi dividend of a multi-choice coalition. We explore three possible interpretations of the support of a multi-choice coalition. Based on these interpretations, we derive three families of Sharing values for multi-choice games. To carry out this study, we examine both novel and classical axioms for multi-choice games, thereby providing an axiomatic foundation for each of these families of values.

Keywords: Multi-choice games; Sharing values; Harsanyi set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00952-4

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