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Cooperative game theoretic results from the tuna fishing problem

Gustavo Bergantiños () and Adriana Navarro-Ramos ()
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Gustavo Bergantiños: ECOBAS, Universidade de Vigo, ECOSOT
Adriana Navarro-Ramos: University of Granada

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 16, 24 pages

Abstract: Abstract Bergantiños et al. (2023) introduce cooperative tuna fishing games. We prove that the core of this game is not empty. We give an explicit formula for the $$\tau $$ -value. We also study the distance game associated with tuna fishing games and prove that it is a generalized big boss game. In most practical cases, the number of vessels is two or three. In these cases, the core and the core cover coincide. Moreover, we provide an explicit formula for the nucleolus.

Keywords: Tuna fishing games; Core; $$\tau $$ -value; Nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00963-1

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