Contest design with threshold objectives

Edith Elkind (), Abheek Ghosh () and Paul W. Goldberg ()
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Edith Elkind: Northwestern University, Department of Computer Science
Abheek Ghosh: University of Oxford, Department of Computer Science
Paul W. Goldberg: University of Oxford, Department of Computer Science

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 18, 42 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study contests where the designer’s objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player’s output if the output of the player is very low or very high. We consider two variants of this setting, which correspond to two objective functions: binary threshold, where the designer’s utility is a non-decreasing function of the number of players with output above a certain threshold; and linear threshold, where a player’s contribution to the designer’s utility is linear in her output if the output is between a lower and an upper threshold, and becomes constant below the lower and above the upper threshold. For both of these objectives, we study rank-order allocation contests and general contests. We characterize the contests that maximize the designer’s objective and indicate techniques to efficiently compute them.

Keywords: Contest theory; Mechanism design; All-pay auctions; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00964-0

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