Dominant strategy implementation of the doctor-optimal stable rule with bilateral contracts

Wataru Ishida () and Taro Kumano ()
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Wataru Ishida: Yokohama National University, Department of Economics
Taro Kumano: Yokohama National University, Department of Economics

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 19, 15 pages

Abstract: Abstract In a doctor-hospital matching problem with bilateral contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005 in American Economic Review, pp. 913-935), if the hospitals’ choice functions satisfy “irrelevance of rejected contracts”, “unilateral substitutability”, and “size monotonicity”, the doctor-optimal stable rule is well-defined and is strategy-proof for the doctors. However, even if a rule is strategy-proof, there may be nontruthful dominant strategies in the direct revelation game associated with it. More importantly, a profile of nontruthful dominant strategies may lead to an allocation that differs from the one that would be chosen for the true preference profile (Dasgupta et al. 1979 in The American Mathematical Monthly, pp.485-194). However, we show that under the above three properties of the hospitals’ choice functions, this does not happen for the doctor-optimal stable rule: the rule is dominant strategy implementable.

Keywords: Cumulative offer process; Strategy-proofness; Dominant strategy implementation; Weak nonbossines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00965-z

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