Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money

Hiroki Shinozaki ()
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Hiroki Shinozaki: Hitotsubashi University, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 20, 35 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study the problem of assigning packages of objects to agents with money. We allow agents to have utility functions that exhibit income effects or face hard budget constraints. It is already known that either income effects or hard budget constraints lead to the non-existence of a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy (Dobzinski et al. in Games Econ Behav 74(2):486–503, 2012; Kazumura and Serizawa in Soc Choice Welf 47(3):633–663, 2016; Baisa in Theor Econ 15(1):361–413, 2020; Malik and Mishra in J Econ Theory 191:105128, 2021 etc.). Given such negative results, we investigate whether rules can satisfy non-obvious manipulability (Troyan and Morrill in J Econ Theory 185:104970, 2020)—an incentive property weaker than strategy-proofness—together with the other three properties. First, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy to also satisfy non-obvious manipulability. Using this result, we show that a modification of a (truncated) pay-as-bid rule, as well as certain Walrasian rules, satisfies all four properties.

Keywords: Non-obvious manipulability; Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Income effects; Hard budget constraints; Package auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00967-x

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