The structure of interaction and modes of reasoning can shape the evolution of conventions

Ennio Bilancini (), Leonardo Boncinelli () and Sedric Zucchiatti ()
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Ennio Bilancini: Piazza S.Francesco 19, IMT School of Advanced Studies
Leonardo Boncinelli: University of Florence, Department of Economics and Management
Sedric Zucchiatti: Piazza S.Francesco 19, IMT School of Advanced Studies

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 22, 20 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study the evolution of conventions in a Stag Hunt game where: (i) agents choose a location to interact locally, (ii) interactions are sometimes global and sometimes local, and (iii) agents can be either fine or coarse reasoners, i.e., agents are able or not, respectively, to distinguish between global and local interactions. We show that the structure of interaction and the mode of reasoning affect the selection of social conventions. Further, we find that the coexistence of coarse and fine reasoning may favor or hinder the adoption of the payoff dominant convention—playing Stag—depending on the structure of interaction. In particular, if interactions are mostly local, then fine reasoning increases the diffusion of Stag. Instead, if interactions are sufficiently global, then fine reasoners are never more collaborative than coarse reasoners and they may even disrupt the emergence of payoff dominant conventions.

Keywords: Risk dominance; Payoff dominance; Stag Hunt game; Coarse reasoning; Fine reasoning; Location choice; Stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00968-w

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