Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models

Nadia Guiñazú (), Noelia Juarez (), Pablo Neme () and Jorge Oviedo ()
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Nadia Guiñazú: Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL–CONICET) and Departamento de Matemática
Noelia Juarez: Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL–CONICET) and Departamento de Matemática
Pablo Neme: Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL–CONICET) and Departamento de Matemática
Jorge Oviedo: Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL–CONICET) and Departamento de Matemática

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 21, 23 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have path-independent choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and firm-quasi-setwise stability. We also examine their relationship to established notions in the literature, such as worker-quasi and firm-quasi stability in both many-to-one and many-to-many markets.

Keywords: Corewise stability; Quasi-stability; Setwise stability; Substitutable choice function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00970-2

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