A folk theorem with unobservable mixtures and endogenous discounting

Asen Kochov () and Yangwei Song ()
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Asen Kochov: University of Rochester, Department of Economics
Yangwei Song: University of Colorado Boulder, Department of Economics

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 2, No 23, 19 pages

Abstract: Abstract Revisiting the setting of Kochov and Song (2023), we study infinitely repeated games in which the players’ rates of time preference may evolve endogenously in the course of the game. Our goal is to establish a folk theorem without the assumption of observable mixtures made in the earlier paper. To that end, we identify a new sufficient condition on preferences which holds automatically in the standard case of time separable utilities and a common discount factor, while being generic in ours.

Keywords: Repeated games; Folk theorem; Recursive utility; Endogenous discounting; Unobservable mixed strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00971-1

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