On private incentives to acquire household production skills
Steinar Vagstad
Journal of Population Economics, 2001, vol. 14, issue 2, 312 pages
Abstract:
In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition.
Keywords: Family; bargaining; ·; household; productivity; ·; gender; roles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H41 J16 J22 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-07-12
Note: Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000
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Working Paper: On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills (2001)
Working Paper: On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills (1999)
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