On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills

Steinar Vagstad

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public good like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power.

Keywords: PRODUCTIVITY; FAMILY; HOUSEHOLD; SEX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H41 J16 J22 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On private incentives to acquire household production skills (2001)
Working Paper: On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:221

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